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prectioners and condemned •• rubish by its critics. This 
thesis begins with the acknowledgement that both statements 
are partially correct. The topic of this paper is enployaent 
policy. But on s higher level , this paper should serve as an 
example of the public policy algorithm in action. It 
attempts to isolate goals, consider policies and their 
interrelationships, and arrive at consistent conclusions and 
r ecoamenda t ions•
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cognisant that the recommendations of this paper will not be 
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illustrate a process and allow those who object to be 
specific in their disagreements snd thus focus the debate.
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snalysis will necessarily reflect the biases of the author.
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IatrodltetJJin
Sine# the 19So recession, unemployment has become a 
chronic problem in tha United States. Potable economists 
have already begun arguing that changes in labor and capital 
demand brought about by our ever-increasing level of 
productivity have fundsaentally altered the problea of 
unemployment. It is no longer only cyolioal in nature; 
Indeed, evidence already indicates the need for 17.5 Billion 
new ^obs by 1990 ^ust to Maintain the current rate of 
unenploynant (English,1983)1 In response to these changing 
characteristics, calls for new enployaent policy have emerged 
fron all oorners of the United States. Similarly, Europe has 
already embarked upon nany new and innovative programs for 
dealing with this emerging global problea. Unfortunately 
the current response to these program? in the United States 
has bean discouraging at bast.
In partloular, this paper starts with the examination of 
the U.S. response to unemployment policy. Tha thesis 
presented here is two-folds [1] a concerted effort by tha 
federal government should be undertaken to deviisp a 
Qomphrebensive active labor marls! palloy; and U )  that such 
a program (at" well as many other federal programs) should be
I .
1
2continually audited with i o cio-economie management (8111} 
principles to provide lor dynamic incremental adjustment.
In this application of principles, the proctaa of public 
poiicy-making will hart such light shad upon it.
•pacifically, it is hoped that thia paper will not only 
illuatrata the appropriate algorithm of decision-making, hut 
alao that thia paper will raiaa several unique —- and 
unfortunately unpublicised --- iaauea which have aiginificant 
importance; what I will refer to aa indirect policy concerna 
(IPC's).
Finally, it ia well recognised that thia paper will not 
find the panacea for the U.S. unemployment problem. Instead, 
this paper will eaamine the iaauea and point out the 
conflicts and problems within government structure which 
piev%%%% a resolution. As Alice tivlin stated in her 
introductory remarks at the annual H. Rows in Gaither Lectures 
is tyatema faience:
If any analyst thought it woe going to be easy to make 
social action programs work better or to make more 
rational choices among programs, be is by now a sadder 
and wiser man. ... So fat the analysts have probably 
done more to rcce%l bom diifieelc the prob lama and 
choices are than to make the decisions easier. (1971:5)
Accordingly, if this paper succeeds in shoving the difficulty 
end conflicts io social policy-aaking, it vill have fulfilled 
an underlying purpose.
Lastly, sowe thing should be said concerning vhat 8 EM 
principles entail. The concept vas largely the result of the 
seminal vork of David Linovts (1973). In general, the 
principles are nothing more than the application of proven 
business aanageaent principles augaented vith social science 
techniques to the probleas of governaent poicy-aaking• 
Precisely, Linoves outlines ten principles vhich are 
self-explanatory in nature (1973:18-32):
1. Tie standards and goals (of programs] to proven human 
needs
2. Apply funding by results
3. Use discretionary funding as incentives
A. Use aulti-disciplinary planning (to develop programs]
3. Set up social profitability audits
8. Establish public visibility
7. Prune and restructure for dynamic grovth
t. %nty the input mix
flit up social competition 
Vt-. Pin reepeaeibi1ity for applying SEN principles
4These simple practices ostensibly appear unimportant and 
trivial. Tat it it precisely overlooked trivialitiea that 
cam make the difference between tncceat and failure of a 
program. Too often government programa are perpetuated by 
increaeed funding in reaponae to a problem which will not go 
away; the possibility that the problem remains due to program 
ineffectiveness ia rarely raised. In the words of Linowes:
The great mats of public programa are little more than a 
habitual perpetuation of the numbers game. Welfare 
programa continue to tally the number of mouths fed, 
poverty bowsing units built, dollars doled out. lot 
what ia our real objective in welfare? Isn't it to make 
people employable, eelf-eufficient, productive, and 
happy by helping them achieve self-respect? Those 
responsible for the purae strings rarely apply this kind 
of standard to our outputs. (1973:52)
Thus, throughout this paper the 8 W  principles shall be 
applied explicitly or implicitly to truly judge the 
effectiveness of both current and proposed policy. In this 
manner, the approach used can be said to be systematic.
In particular, principles 111 , [4 ] , [7) , [81 and I9)are
5relevant to proposed policy change; principle*
(2] , [3 ] , [5 ] , [6] «nd [10] are aost relevant to on-going policy 
•valuation and improvement -- dynavic increaental 
adjustment, if you will.
This paper will be sequential in its treataent. In 
chapter two, the current haras and future prospects lor 
eaployaent are considered in depth. In chapter three, a 
digression into social choice theory is undertaken to 
establish what the ultiaate goals of governaent policy aight 
be; this section aay be skipped without loss of continuity to 
the reader and necessarily reflect persona] biases. The 
fourth chapter develops and explains the issues surrounding 
several proposed eaployaent policies in a brief expoeitional 
manner. In chapter five, the IPC's are addressed. Chapter 
six examines the political realities involved in public 
policy-making. And finally conclusions for governaent policy 
and the public policy-making professions are offered in 
chapter seven.
II.
«P4 Spc-Lai Costs of Unemployment
One of Che first principles of soc io-econom ic management 
is to tie standards and goals to proven huaan needs. 
Consequently an investigation of the uneaployaent problea as 
it relates specifically to huaan concerns is in order.
(i). Ih.Elt.nt of th. Probl..
It is clear that uneaployaent has becoae a greater 
problea in recent years as evidenced by the double-digit 
uneaployaent which occured in the early 1980's for the first 
tiae since the Great Depression. And according to aoat 
econoaists and forecasters, we should not expect a aucb 
future which is aucb better. For exaaple, the Congressional 
Budget Office reported a projected uneaployaent rate of 7.5 
percent for 1988. Furthermore, Barry Boaworth, an econoaist 
at the Brookings Institution, argues that the CBO rate would 
be 8.5 percent if a aore plausible estiaate of CNF growth 
were used (Boaworth,1983:180}. Bven aore pessiaistic is 
Hacarov's arguaent that such an official rate further 
underestinates "actual1' uneaployaent because of definitional 
probleas (e.g., aoaeone who gives up job search in 
desperation is no longer "unemployed"). Subsequently, Macarov
6
7claim that theta unemployment figures nay he "from 50 to 100 
percent below the nunber of people wanting to work,"
(1980:96) Thus, conbining the claim of both Bosworth and 
Nacarov yields an unenploynent rate for the innediate future 
which is in the double-digits. The outlook is not 
optimistic.
(lO. Ttp.» of Pn.«plQT«.Bt
There are essentially two types of unenploynent: 
cyclical and pernanent. Cyclical unenploynent results fron 
economic downturns and business cycles. Current monetary and 
fiscal policies are designed to combat these fluctuations, 
but economics must progress much further before the degree of 
fine-tuning necessary to prevent temporary layoffs can be 
implemented. The workers! nevertheless! feel the effects 
these these cycles.
Permanent unemployment is unemployment which results 
fron changes in the structure of the economy that are not 
temporary in nature. Today, technological unemployment is 
the most serious form of permanent unemployment as English 
noted earlier. Vassily Leontieft an internationally 
recognised economist, explained the problem as follows:
8There are signs today, however, that past experience 
cannot serve as a rtliable guide for the futura of 
technological change. With the advent of solid-state 
electronics, machines that have been displacing hunan 
muscle from the production of goods are being succeeded 
by machines that take over the function of the human 
nervous system, not only in production, but in service 
industries as veil. ... The relation between man and 
machine is being radically transformed. (1982:188)
Moreover, Leontief vent on in his article to explain that 
given the rate of productivity growth, "the creation of one 
additional job that 20 years ago might have required an 
investment of $50,000 now demands $100,000 and in 20 years 
will demand $500,000." (1982:189) It is precisely this 
problem, combined with the growing labor force, which has led 
to such dire predictions as English's.
It should be noted in rebuttal that some economists do 
not view technological unemployment as a critical problem. 
They argue that the problem is not nearly so serious due to 
America s insatiable demand for new goods. Instead they see 
the problem as one in retraining and transfering our labor 
force to new industries. William McCaughey, however, 
examined evidence from both sides of this issue and concluded
9that while statistics such sc English's sight be exaggerated! 
there will still be a massive problee with technological 
unemployment in the near future (1981). Indeed, we are 
beginning to feel the effects of it slresdy,
(Hi). 9f Vtmglftiatiii
Hawing quantified the rate of unemployment, we now turn 
to the quantification of the haras. It is hard to state the 
psychologica1 and emotional turbulence that the unemployed 
worker goes through, but it is possible to measure the 
results of that turbulence. Dr. Hsrvey Brenner of Johns 
Hopkins University produced the first work in this field with 
his 1976 report on the socisl costs of national economic 
policy delivered before the Joint Economic Committee of the 
U.8. Congress. Specifically, Brenner found that a one 
percent increse in the rate of unemployment sustained over a 
period of six years has been associated with an additional 
36,886 deaths. Of these, 20,000 are cardiovascular deaths,
494 are from cirrhosis of the liver, 920 are suicides, and 
648 are homicidea. Furthermore, he found the same one 
percent increase was sssociated with 3,340 more admissions to 
state prisons and 4,227 more admissions to mental hospitals 
(Brenner,1976)•
To give full justice to the controversies surrounding
10
Brenner's hypotheses end the suggested csusslity would 
require s book in itself. But to quickly suaaarise, the 
aejor arguments against Brenner's aethodology concern his 
tiae lags and the causal leap his study iaplies. In terns of 
lagSi it is argued that the results are reversed with a lag 
tiae of one year or less. This arguaent, however, has been 
well refuted by several sociologists (Brenner,1982; Draper, 
at si,1979). In terns of the causality dispute, sociologist 
Gravelle has argued that it is difficult to aake the juap 
froa association to causation (iaplied through induced 
stress} because of the aany intervening variables; see 
Col ledge (1982) for a review. Others such as Forbes have 
clearly deaonstrated Gravelle's intervening variable 
contention to be faulty (1981).
In suaaary, aany researchers have replicated Brenner's 
results with radically different aethodo logies • Only a 
handful have not corresponded with the original Brenner 
hypothesis and these latter studies have been rigorously 
attacked by the profession. Aaong the replicators are the 
World Health Organisation, Hagen, Brenner, Draper, Feraan, 
Davidson, Pavalko, Srole and Hollingahead and Bedlich,
Powell, Kephart, Selling and Steinberg, and Bagedorn and 
Labovite; see Brenner (1982), Draper, et al (1979), Peraan 
(1983), Segalaan and Basu (1981), or Hagen (1983) for a
11
review of the literature.
On the wore huaan tide of the uneaployaent issue, most 
sociologists sake the contention that work has an intrinsic 
value in society which is necessary for identity and a full 
life. Professors Segalaao and Baau of California State 
University stated:
Work is closely tied with the social and psychological 
developaent of Ban that it is alaost impossible to think 
of vhat it aeons to be huaan without thinking of work. 
Without work a person has little on which to base his 
identity or to identify how he fits into society, if at 
all. (1981:310)
Certainly work is necessary for self-esteea. It is the 
cornerstone of life and unites the individuals of a society. 
High and persistent joblessness condeans individuals to the 
•conoaic scrap heap. And this condeanation apparently 
aanifests itself in the very real effects outliaed by Brenner 
and his colleagues.
(iv). Su.a.rv
All of the above analysis of the uaeaployaent pxoblea 
should leave us with a few distinct conclusions. First,
12
unemployment is individually and socially harmful --- and not 
only in tarns of lost income, but sort important 1y, in tarns 
of inductd strass. Secondly, tha problem of unemploynant , 
both cyclical and tethnological , naads to ba dealt oith in 
order to furnish a sound future for tha United States and its 
workers•
The contention that unemployment is a significant ill 
does not itself provide the Justification for ridding 
ourselves of it. Ve nust first nake certain what is necessary 
to justify government intervention and whet the effects of 
any proposed change would he. Ve exanine the first of these 
iseuis in the next chapter.
nIflcill Theory ind tb> froblti of PPtnploiBitU
In recent years there has been an overvhleming 
rtvitalitstion of political philosophy and social theory lad 
by John tawls' Theory of Just ice. Subsequent theories of 
public policy, lav, and economic distribution have reflected 
upon tavls and sought to apply social theory to the 
explanation end justification of current social policy. 
C.rt.inl jr not *lnc. B.nthaa't Principle of Hor.li and 
L.al»latlon aad Black.ton.'a Ca«..ntati.a hava there bean 
such debates and analyses of government purpose.
This revitalisation provides society vith notarial for 
the long put off debates concerning social values. 
Particularly, in public policy and government decision-making 
a value debate is essential. A policy analyst can instruct 
the decision-maker as to a policy's effects on a given goal 
or objective, but she can not choose the appropriate goals to 
maximise* And even if such goals could be found, they mould 
likely conflict and therefore require relative weighting. 
Without some information for this "weight vector," the matrix 
solution for a given problem cannot be comprehensively solved 
in the classical sense:
iii .
Hgoal 1 •••goal n vghts* of goals net effaces
policy A 
policy B
A1 i ••• Ail
11 Bn X
vaight of 1 
veight of 2 ■
net A 
net B
policy H
e a «
J.1 ... Hn —^
e • • s
Jtgight of n
•  • •
•  _
Hanct, ve ara laft in the sana predicaaent that policy 
scienca profited to reaove us froa. Policy science say 
deteraine tha relationships matrix, but it does not deteraine 
the vaight vactor. Vhile bafora va vara choosing policias 
intuitivaly and politically, policy science has laft us 
choosing goals and their vaights intuitively and politically* 
Certainly an iaproveaent , but a problea nevertheless. Vhila 
tha aatheaatics and economics of policy science are sound, 
othar inputs in tha decisoo-aaking process ara necessary*
Tha currant value debate in social choice theory 
provides us vith a logical foundation to ha used vith 
aeasuresent science to clarify tha surrounding value 
decisions* Of course I have no pretentions of finding tha 
ansver in this debate. Merely, it is ay purpose to drav out 
a synthesis of theory based on soaa basic assuaptions vhich 
can illustrate tha purpose of govarnaent in tha context of 
policy-making* Hence, this chapter presents a theory vith
15
basic values, magnum boDun, sod their lexical order of 
maximication to aliow the policy developer to apply their 
empiricisms and logically choose the best value decison on 
the basis of their evidence. Ideally, this chapter 
demonstrates how values can be synthesised by policy makers 
even though the assumptions or final theory of this paper 
might be rejected.
In order to attempt this, I start with three basic 
assumptions about society. From these assumptions, other 
theories of social justice can also be examined in a standard 
framework. Finally, a synthesis of theory can be made and an 
application of the theory can be shown.
(i). Am vpticpj ior loci.l Choict Thtor.
1. ALL BBIAVIOI II DBTBBHIIISTIC. Tbii Muaptioo ar,u«« that 
all action (including the words on this page and the reader's 
interpretations) is a function of three deterministic 
factors: environment, genetic makeup and randomness. Thus, 
the deterministic equation for behavior becomes:
behavior * f(environment, genes, randomness)
This is an incredibly powerful statement. It suggests that 
all conceptions of human thought such as motivation, legal
16
behavior, etc. are opt the result of some inner element of 
the individual vhieh chooses to he ’'good.'1 lather, such 
action is based on factors vhieh are outside the control of 
the individual. For example, a decision to go to college in 
order to improve one's environment is a product of past 
environment vhieh no one had control over. Clearly, vithin 
the fraaevorfc of thia model, the concept of "merit" 
degeneratea. Merit can no longer mean "merit” if it is based 
on external and individually uncontrollable factors. Merit 
becomes random vithin this model.
Under the assumption that "merit" is undeserved, certain 
values of fairness and equity emerge vithin a social system. 
Merit and revards for merit are, in essence, determined by an 
imaginary lottery vhieh assigns social position and vealth. 
Because of the lottery nature of this assumption, it is 
unfair for one member of a social order to obtain higher 
status over another. Of course, there are competing values 
present and "fairness" has yet to be adequately defined. 
Consequently, I define fairness in my second assumption.
2•JUSTICE, AS PAIEMESS, IS DITBIMIIBD VITHIN THE CONTEXT OF 
TIE "OEIGINAL POSITION." John Harsanyi (1953:634) initially 
developed the concept of the "original position" vhieh vas 
later vastly expanded upon by lavls. To summarise, the
1 7
theory maintains that those standards vhich would be chosen 
by individuals under a Mveil of ignorance" and acting as a 
rational egoist are fair (and consequently just) standards. 
Bawls defines this situation as the "original position." 
Consider for example five individuals creating a society 
before knowledge of which of the five positions they will 
each occupy. Coder this veil of ignorance each person will 
likely consider the prospect of being assigned either the 
lowest position or the highest position in the society and 
will construct their society with such considerations. Thus, 
any outcome that an individual is assigned is fair in that 
they acquiesced to that possibility before the assignment.
It is much like the common approach to dividing up a cake.
The person who does the cutting gets last choice which she 
directly accepts as fair by the virtue of her position in the 
distribution process.
A final note concerning this assumption. This paper 
does not assume Bawls' "principles of justice" derived from 
the original position are necessarily valid. Bather, it only 
recognises that the concept of tne original position is a 
valid tool for examining philosophical issues in the value
debate•
18
3.TIB 7V0 PBMAIY GOALS OF GOVBBMMBHT ABB TO FBOMOTB BOTB 
BFFICimCY ABO JOSTICB. This, like the prior assumptions, is 
• strong statement, It holds that the only two magnum bonua 
•re efficiency and justice. There is nothing else for 
governaent to do. It should try to eliainate the inequity of 
the random lottery while simultaneously trying to promote 
efficiency. There is often an inherent tradeoff involved.
And because any changes in justice must be carried out by an 
outside force, government must be the sole actor. Moreover, 
since any action concerning fairness also affects efficiency, 
the governaent must be the actor here as well.
Hence we find the traditional justification for 
governaent involvement. As Stokey and Zeckhauser stated in 
their public policy text:
In sum we believe that government participation in 
resource allocation processes of society can be 
justified on two grounds only: (1] equity: a more 
desirable distribution of goods and services among the 
members of the society is fostered. (2] efficiency: 
effciciency is promoted in situations where the aarket 
has failed.
It is the governaent's duty to be the final arbiter in
19
til problems of effloienoy tod Justloe.
The prevl( 3 three assumptions are vast and powerful. 
Accordingly, If there are any faulta in thla chapter*# 
arguments, I would venture to plaoe the blame In these three 
statements. Notwithstanding, with these assumptions granted, 
it is my conclusion that all of the arguments presented m  
the following pages are aoourate. Specifically, I propose 
that the common theory of equality of opportunity is 
Inherently inadequate, and the theories of darwlnlsm, 
utilitarianism, and Rawls' theory of justice all have 
significant shortcommings. Yet from these same theories, Z 
will argue a new theory of sooial order may be formulated.
But first, an examination of ourrent sooial theory is 
appropriate.
(11). Analyan of Curr.nt Social Th.crl.. und.r th. 
fr.Tlout Ai.uMPtiona
The four baslo theories whioh best exemplify the 
diversity of sooial theory are equality of opportunity, 
darwlnlsm, utilitarianism, and Rawls' principles of Justice. 
However, under the oontext of the three sooial assumptions, 
all of these theories dramatically ohange in validity.
20
1. E Q O A L m  OP OPPORTDRITT. The theory of equality of 
opportunity as it ia presented by its aost vooal advocates 
such as Milton Priednan (1980) argues for equlalty of 
opportunity for every individual, but not equality of 
outcones. Priednan uses the analogy of life aa a race* What 
we should strive for are fair rules for all to participate 
by, and not a rigged race where everyone cones in first. Be 
further argues that any forn of equality of outoones results 
in a loss of liberty and personal autonony. But Friedman's 
analysis does not stand up under the assunptions for two 
reasons.
Initially, Friedman's reasoning presupposes Independent 
values for freedon and liberty. Re separates issues of 
distribution and liberty as two oonflioting values. Under the 
"original position" assunptlon, however, both liberty and 
distribution are oonponenta of the higher value of ^ustloe. 
Benoe, rather than aasune liberty to be an end in itself 
whloh is above distribution, it should be evaluated in a 
larger framework of justice. With this notion, the whole 
conept of equality of opportunity is nlsleadlng. The 
application of suoh a theory would only promote liberty and 
not direotly justice.
A more damaging criticism of equality of opportunity is
21
that it it bated upon a system of merit* In other words, the 
winners of a race thould get the prite becauae they were 
fatter than the rett. Furthermore, Friedman would add that 
the lotert would not want it any other way* Hit argument it 
an analogy of a game of bacarat:
The people who choote to play may atart the evening with 
equal pilet of chipt, but at play progrettet, thote 
piles will become unequal. By the end of the evening, 
tome will be big winnert, othert big lotera. In the name 
of the ideal of equality, thould the winnert be required 
to repay the lotert? That would take all the fun out of 
the game* Not even the lotert would like that. They 
might like it for the one evening, but would they come 
back again to play if they knew that whatever happened, 
they'd end up exactly where they ttarted? (1980:137)
Here the teveral problems with equality of opportunity 
pote themtelvet. First, it attumet that everyone atartt with 
equal chipe which later changes fully dependent upon the 
player. In the real world, however, the start it unequal* 
Secondly, the analogy does not consider that the player with 
the most chipt will have the easiest time winning even more: 
that teems closer to the real way wealth it accumulated in
22
society. Finally, his analogy asiusci an even natch of 
players. Just as players nay cot return to the gave if they 
always get the sane anount of chips through redistribution, 
it is also likely that few players would return if they were 
cotinually beaten by a world chanpion baccarat player.
Sone happy nediun nust be found. We want everyone to 
participate vigorously in the gsne (social efficiency) but we 
want everyone to have an equal chance for winning in any 
given evening of play. If there were sone way for an outside 
party to equalise the players (and not the chips), then we 
would seemingly solve both problens. Otherwise, the game 
isn't fair to the players who are below average due to no 
fault of their own, but who are nevertheless required to play 
the gane.
2. ECONOMIC DAEVIIIIM. Economic darwiniam argues for the 
merits of prohibiting redistribution. Darwinists suggest 
that those in the lower strata of society are inherently 
unable to function in capitalistic economy and should 
therefore be kept in the small ranges at the bottom of the 
system.
The shortcommings of this theory are also found under 
the merit assumption; the theory of darwinism presupposes 
that merit is valuable. Clearly, this is not true. If the
23
reasons for poverty in an economy are not based upon inherent 
characterisitc• of the individual (i.e., genes) but rather on 
raodoaneii, then darwinism has no justification. As Lester 
Thurow of MIT critiques the theory:
Attempts have been made to rescue the postulates of 
consumption and income maximisation with analogies based
on natural selection --  economic darwinism. Firms and
individuals vho survive economically must be better 
maximisers than others, or they would not have survived. 
"Survival of the fittest" makes maximisation a 
reasonable postulate. But as recent work on the biology 
of natural selection shows, "survival of the fittest" is 
not synonymous with "indivudal maximisation." Survival 
is instead a group process wfrere random changes in the 
environment can turn species survival into random good 
or bad luck. To prove that a species is optimal, you 
must be able to point to the specific characteristics 
that permit one to survive and another to become 
extinct. And this no one has been able to do. Whenever 
a given characteristic is aserted to be the reason for a 
species' becomming extinct, another species that 
survived can be found with the same characteristic. 
Survival, therefore, cannot be taken to mean
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SMtximiistion. (1984:218)
Thuii given the assumption of no merit, darvift ism i# 
invalid. PandoiftPM |i the primary cause of economic poverty, 
so economic attrition will be an unsuccessful policy.
3. UTILITARIAN! Stf * Ut j li t a r i an i *m i t» probably the most 
widely criticised social thsety today* Perhaps this ic 
deserved, titHit«risni*® does produce some theoretical 
outcomes which tend to aggravate the moral sensibilities of 
most people* Tat, simultaneouily utilitarianism provides a 
unique and timeless method for ssaminiag social policy and 
lav. In (act i cost-bansf it analysis seems to have found its 
birth in the concepts of "felicific calculus." Regardless, 
the criticisms rtmsin* the theory of utilitarianism has three 
problems•
first, uti 1 it«risnism provides its user with measurement 
problems. To measure "happiness" of society becomes 
ambiguous. We do not know exactly what to measure. This is 
not to say that it could not be undertaken at some 
theoretical level, but rather that utilitarianism has 
application problem* Some theorists have tried to overcome 
this barrier by providing distinct measurement systems such 
as Posner's "wealth maximisation" and pareto-opimaltiy
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arguments. When presented with a distinct and specific 
problem area, utilitarianism can arguably be reduced to 
measurable criteria within the system (i.e., through 
empirical social science research).
A second argument issued against utilitarianism is its 
moral monstrousity. In fact, this is the principle argument 
Igiinst utilitarianism which is hurled by Posner (1984). The 
argument goes J j be this: utilitarianism, taken to its 
ext rage, argues for actions which few would consider proper, 
for instance, if the ggan good of a society could be 
maximised by killing its wealthy and distributing their 
riches such action ihould be undertaken, this is an 
indefensible result of uti1 it at Ianism. However, it would not 
be stretching Intuition to suggest that such action could 
decrease social happiness in the long run by building a sense 
of fear into tbe society. Thus, the argument is s dispute of 
semantics: what does utility include?
Finally, utilitarianism can be seen as unjust. Let's 
examine this argument from the "original position" developed 
in the second assumption. Within this original position, it 
is doubtful that anyone would truly wish to maximise the 
total or average happiness of society. Given the following 
systems (1,11 and III) and individuals (A,$ ,C ,0 and I) it i S 
highly unlikely that if such an original position were ever
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present that uti1itariansin would be the criteria for
decision. In. b. : numbers ref lect the "happiness" of the
individual; sums reflect "happiness " of the soc i et y 1
A B C D E SOM
Soc i e ty I 25 25 25 25 25 125
Society II 200 0 0 0 0 200
Soc iety III 40 30 30 30 20 150
In fact, a recent survey conducted so as to determine whether 
individuals would be risk neutral (utilitarians) or risk 
averse in the original position overwhelmingly showed they 
would tend to be risk averse; see notes for methodology. But 
at the same time, the study demonstrated that the same 
individuals are not so risk averse to choose egalitarian 
societies. Insteadsthey sought a happy tradeoff between the 
extremes. In the illustration above, the research 
demonstrates most would choose society III from the original
position — - unlike the utilitarians who would choose II or
*
the egalitarians who would choose I. This same result was 
well behaved under controls for sex, race, and income which 
suggests that the social position has no affect on the choice 
made. Bence, utilitarianism is inconsistent with assumption 
111.
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4. lewis' Theory of Justice* Sauls would certisnly agree to 
the first two assumption! concerning deterwini11 and 
fairness. Re vould, however, depart from the third 
assumption by arguing justice takes precedence over 
efficiency* In particular, he contends that the appropriate 
decision-rule for persons in the original position would be 
the caximin rule; individuals would choose the society with 
the best worst outcomes* Thus, if the original position 
consisted of the following two societies,
A B C D E SOM
Society I 25 25 25 25 25 125
Society II 24 30 40 50 60 204
agents would always choose Society I* This is intuitively 
suspect.
I will argue here that Rawls has introduced a problem 
into his work by attempting a lexical ordering of one goal 
over another* It is quite arguable that the two goals are 
not totally without complement effects. For instance, it is 
reasonable to suggest individuals consider both the 
distribution and the efficiency of their society in the 
original position. Thus, instead of relying exclusively on
8the maximin rule, members of the original position also 
consider the efficiency of the system. If social 
stratification leads to an environsient vhich activates its 
citicens to increase their output, agents in the original 
position would notice this and perhaps choose a system with 
some stratification. For example, in the above illustration, 
members might pick society II for its efficiency advantage 
over I. Thus, efficency is consistent with justice if it is 
considered within the original position.
Because of Bawls' distinct ordering of justice over 
efficiency in all cases, it is difficult to accept his 
egalitarian conclusions or his somewhat arbitrary maximin 
rule as realistic. Because of this, I present the following 
synthesis consistent with the original position and 
determinism.
(iii). 8vnth.» i. .nd Conclusion.
The synthesis which I present is straightforward and 
merely an alteration of Bawls' theory. In particular, I 
would discard the maximin rule and argue that the agents have 
all information within the original position except for their 
positions in the resulting society. Consequently, they would 
choose a society which has the optimal mix of both equity and 
efficiency•
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For our purpose, this synthesis provides all the 
justification needed for deciding the direction of 
government policy. If a particular change incrementally 
improves both efficiency and equity in a society, me knom it 
at least moves us closer to the social optimal. Moreover, if 
government is the only possible actor mhich can move us to 
this closer state, then certainly government action is 
justified.
For example, consider the following diagrammatic 
situation:
efficiency
It is shown here that efficency is a function of equity.
This is a realistic scenario. Evidence from Segalman and 
Basu (1981) and Ocawa (1982) both indicate that some degree 
of stratfication is necessary for a society to be productive. 
And evidence from Dugger and Tawney (1978) indicates that too 
much inequity hurts a society's productivity. Accordingly,
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if unemployment hurts society's efficency, we would be to the
left of point B* Furthermore* if the freemsrket can only
\
take us to point A, it is justified for government to 
intervene to raise us to point B. In such a move, both equity 
and efficiency are improved upon and we subsequently know we 
are moving toward the social optimal - — whatever that may 
be* Of course, it may also be true that the social optimal 
lies beyond point B, but we can not be sure of this without 
second-guessing the original position*
It is the conclusion of this chapter that employment 
policies would be consistent with such a socially optimal 
move* Specifically, given the high social costs of 
unemployment and the inequity which it generates, I believe 
any rational agent within the original position would choose 
a society with full employment policies for its citicens.
This would tend to 'equalise the players in the bacarat 
game*' Thus equality of opportunity would exist to an great 
extent, the harms of unemployment would be eradicated, and 
major inequities would be attenuated* Only if the social 
costs of such a policy outweighed the benefits would agents 
decide otherwise. Consequently, an examination of the 
potential employment policies and the issues surrounding them 
is timely* In particular, we must test these policies with 
regards to the afforementioned SEM principles and consider
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t h e  
in t
indirect policy concern*. We now turn to *uch analyse* 
he following chapter*.
IV.
An.lv.ii of E w p lovtnt Policies
The first principle of socio-economic management is to 
tie standards and goals to proven human needs. In the 
previous two chapters, it vas concluded that real human .ieeds 
required full employment opportunities. Ve are nov concerned 
with how to achieve these opportunites and what the 
respective cost will be. And thus ve turn to other principles 
of SEM: multidisciplinary planning, pruning and restructuring 
programs for dynamic grovth, and varying the input mil. The 
following policies concern themselves with these principles. 
They all, for the most part, are the result of debates within 
and between academic disciplines and professionals 
(i.e. ,multidisciplinary planning); most have as their basis 
some form of change to allow for better results and growth; 
and most are innovations in the system (i.e.,varied input 
mix). In particular, policies of income maintenance, 
workfare, macroeconomic stabilisation, job banks, job 
training and education, worksharing, and public employment 
will be considered. From these considerations, policy 
interrelationships may be farmed and policy impacts 
evlauated.
This list of policies can be Appropriately classified
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into two categories: indirect employment policy and Active 
tabor Market Policy (ALMP). Policies of income maintenance, 
workfare, and macroeconomic stabilisation belong to the 
former group while policies of job banks, job training, 
worksharing, and public employment belong to the latter. 
Vilensky innovated the dit limit ion a# follow#:
ly active labor market policy we mean direct government 
action to shape the demmmd for labor by maintaining or 
creating jobs; to incressa the supply and quality of 
labor mobility via placement, counseling and mobility 
incentives. It is cmooterpesed to such passive policies 
as unemployment insurance and public assistance* *.. 
Always excluded ere measures that may affact tha labor 
market indirectly: fiscal and monetary policy, 
regulation and deregulation, income pel i d e a , or trade 
and industrial policies* (1985:1)
He consider each group separately.
Indirect Employment Policies
(i). IneoB. Majnttn.no
Initially, the goal* of incone n.intenance need to be
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scrutinise^ As Linowes indicated earlier, the gesl ©f 
welfare policy is to make people ©mp1oysb1e , productive and 
self-sufficient. Proponents of income main!taance policies 
such as AFDC argue transfers are necessary since most of 
those in poverty need income supplements to survive. Critics 
present two objections to the direct solution of income 
supplements: [1] job creation and employment are the best way 
to increase incomes and reduce the poverty problem, and (2) 
income transfers by themselves destroy the inceptive to work.
On the first criticism concerning employment, most 
sociologists and economists agree the best solution is to get 
the able-bodied workers into the workforce (hsvy,|980;
8 c h i 1 ter ,1910 ; Segalman and Bssu,19llj Ostitigsr »1911 \
Bemdick #11§2 ; Or.wa,1912} lodgers ,1979,1912) . As Bhiller 
noted :
It is even more important to emphasis* that without 
determined full employment policies, all other efforts 
to eliminate poverty are rendered impotent, (1980:193)
The reasona behind Ihiller's statement are twofold, first, 
as Levy argued, ov^r half of the poor households in the 0*8. 
ere headed by an able-boditd workiog-sgs man (1910i14). 
Secondly, with full employment policies, we can better
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iMHltentrste on those truly in need of ineome transfer*. Tf 
• )1 able-bod ied individuals are working, the poverty 
population will be smaller sad nor# adequately dealt with, 
ffcua, the argument rune that attack* on unemployment 
directly raducaa tha poverty problem. gone have even 
estimated the tffacta quant:itatit$ t f : M* one p " c # r f 
reduction in the natieaal vaempie/gfear rate can bring 1 . 5  
iillioa peraena out of pewerty." (Bendick ,1982 : 2 5 2  )
On the aecond criticism concerning work incentives, 
tftare i* alao wide agreenent among the academic community 
that current transfer policies destroy incentives to work 
(Greene ,1*81; Levy,1980 ; Rodgers ,1982 ; Darity,1983;
Garfinkel , 1114). For example, Garfinkel'a description of the 
dilenna in AFDC payments illuatretea the problem:
Because AFDC, like any welfare program, is designed to 
aid only the poorf benefits are reduced when earnings 
increase. After four months on a job, a woman on AFDC 
faces a btnefit reduction of a dollar for every dollar 
that she earns. That is equivalent to a 100 percent tax 
on earnings. (1984:115)
Certainly, such dependency and lack of incentives generated 
by the current income transfer programs need more attention.
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Programs must be restructured and pruned wbli amp 1oymsnt 
policies need to be increased. The input mix requital 
variance.
(ii). Woikfa r.
Workfare policies are designed to motivate welfare 
recipients to seek employment, to train them in job skills, 
and to return to society some amount of its income transfers. 
To do this, workfare policies require welfare recipients who 
are able-bodied to work or accept training or lose their 
benefits. Currently, their is no national workfare program, 
although a few states have experimented with programs.
The appeal of workfare is great. Such a program 
benefits workers and society alike. It is often paid lip 
service by both conservatives and liberals. Moreover, survey 
research indicates most recipients would prefer to work for 
their benefits and therefore receive training and job skills 
in the process (Macarov,1980). Presidential Assistant Robert 
Carleson expressed the administration's position:
Able-bodied workers should be required to work in useful 
public employment for their benefits until they are able 
to find work in the private sector. If able-bodied 
persons do not do all they can to support themselves and
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their families and instead take assistance from those 
who are working to support themselves and their 
families, not only are they debased and demeaned, but an 
unfair burden is placed on the taxpaying workers as 
well. (1981:14)
Certainly workfare as a solution to the nation's unemployment 
problems is very attractive. There is one major obstacle, 
however.
If workers are made out of welfare recipients, current 
workers tend to get displaced. In other words, if jobs are 
not created or demanded, then workfare tends to merely 
redistibute the unemployment —- not to reduce it. Mary 
Criswald, Executive Director of the Workers' Rights Institute 
of Milwaukee, for instance, claims that the program which has 
been implemented in her city caused the loss of about 1000 
jobs to workfsre recipients (Demkovich , 1983). Furthermore, 
Cassetty has argued that workfare programs will only be 
successful in aress where the unemployment rate is relatively 
low (1983). Consequently, while workfare provides a strong 
incentive to work (unlike current welfare programs), such a 
program by itself cannot significantly affect the 
unemployment rate without corresponding job creation.
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(iii). M.cro.conoaic St.bll intioa
Two objections exist sgsinst macroeconomic fine-tuning 
as a solution to Lhe empoyment problem. First, stabilisation 
tends only to adress cyclical problems in the economy, not 
long run permanent unemployment as outlined in chapter 2.
Even if monetary and fiscal policies vere as effective as 
their proponents claim, they would still be inappropriate for 
the problem at hand. Jobs need to be created and training 
needs to be undertaken.
A second objection contends if such stabilisation policy 
could be used to provide jobs to all wanting work, the fiscal 
and monetary intensity would be greater than is politically 
acceptable. As Thurow stated:
The reasons are many --  fears of more inflation, time
lags in decision-processes, incompetence --- but 
whatever the reasons, we need to face the fact that our 
economy and our institutions will not provide jobs to 
everyone willing to work. They have never done so, and 
as currently structured, they never will. When it comes 
to unemployment, we are consistently the industrial 
economy with the worst record. (1980:203}
Consequently, macroeconomic stabilisation policy, while
3 9
appropriate for the remedy of short-term fluctuations in 
•conomic behavior, is not very appropriate for eradicating 
long-run problems of unemployment.
After examining the indirect employment policies 
available, it becomes apparent that a more direct attack on 
unemployment is necessary. Income maintenance attacks 
symptoms, not causes; workfare only motivates job search, but 
does not aid in that search; and stabilisation policy is 
certainly failing to provide full employment. Institutional 
changes in the labor market provide some interesting policy 
alternatives. We examine those now.
Active Labor Market Policies
(i). Job Banks
Job banks are relatively simple in construction; they 
are centers for information dissemination to both employers 
and workers concerning the availability of jobs and labor. 
Furthermore, some variants have counseling and mobility 
incentives to aid in the reindustrialisation movement. This, 
it is argued, makes the labor market more efficient and 
thereby lowers the natural rate of unemployment. Without 
going into a lengthy digression on economic policy, this 
basically means that the infamous Phillips curve shifts to
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the left allowing a lover rate of inflation for a given rate 
of unemployment. Bence, the inflation-unemployment tradeoff 
would be lessoned under a system of nationwide job banks 
(Dornbusch,Fischer,1984:433),
inflation rate
(ii). Job Tt.lniat ip< Eduction
The principle argument for increased education and 
retraining for workers consists of the following: because 
industries are changing and many workers are improperly 
trained for the new demands on labor, massive retraining 
programs should be instituted; moreover, much of the current 
unemployment is due to the lack of skills of available 
able-bodied individuals. In particular, there are three 
issues involved. First, what are the effects of education on
unemp1oyment
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economic growth and productivity?; second, dots education 
attenuate unemployment?; and finally, what would an effective 
eduation program require?
Concerning the question of productivity growth in the 
United 8tates resulting fro* education, the evidence is 
conclusive: education boosts productivity. A statistical 
regression on education's benefits conducted by McMahon 
(1984) using data fro* the U.8. and OECD countries yielded 
results consistent with this conclusion:
When capital formation per worker as measured by 
increased educational attainment of the working age 
population is introduced into (the regression equation], 
it always has the expected positive sign. It is a 
significant factor in explaining productivity growth in 
the relatively stable period from 1955 to 1970 and 
continues to have a positive relation to productivity 
growth in the unstable period from 1970 to 1980. 
(1984:98)
Intuitively, education is an important causal factor in 
describing the productivity growth of the U.S.
Statistically, it is also significant.
But what are the effects of education upon unemployment?
According to Goodwin, the chief cause of unemployment among 
tht poor is not lack of incentive as much as it is lack of 
skills (1983:147). Moreover, evidence fro* both Osawa (1982) 
and Shiller (1980) indicate education is directly linked to 
unemployment and poverty. People with limited job skills are 
least likely to obtain a job, and the most likely to be laid 
off during economic downturns. Finally, job training 
programs hsve had a success in helping the unemployed develop 
marketable skills (Rodgers , 1979) • As Rodgers summed up the 
literature, NStudies of training programs differ in their 
sophistication and conclusions, but all agree that a large 
proportion of the unemployed can be trained for jobs and that 
the job training programs generally have a positive, 
worthwhile impact on enrollees." (188) The final question is 
what an effective program would require to make a national 
impact on the unemployment rate. As one would expect, such a 
program wot 'd require considerable commitment by the federal 
government. As English noted:
Getting ecnomically disadvantaged workers ready for 
entry-level work or even training for specific jobs 
will, in the judgment of some experts, require an 
enormous commitment to training that only the federal 
government has the resources to make. (19C3:24)
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Furthermore, a national program would require job creation 
for the educated workers. Without complementary job 
creation( we can expect work training to have little effect. 
Even if we fully educate the unemployed poor, we would do 
little to reduce unemployment. Rather we would merely have a 
very qualified unemployed work force. Job creation must be 
combined with educational programs (Shi11er , 1980 ;
Rodgers,1982). Finally, involvement with the business 
commmunity is essential so that their training needs fer 
workers coincide with governmental programs. This latter 
requirement, unfortunately, is currently overlooked by the 
government and is the main reason why some of the job 
training programs have foiled. Lodge and Glass critisised 
the government's program for this reason:
Job training is an example of using authority without 
the necessary competence. In 1981, the federal 
government spent more than $6.3 million on job training, 
but few of the trainees ended up with permanent jobs. 
Host of the expenditure provided nothing more than 
temporary income maintenance. The failure to involve 
business adequately in the program and to employ its
44
essential competence meant waste and disappointvent• 
(1982:63-4)
Consequently, for job training to be efective, we need a 
definite and substantial federal commitment, job creation, 
and buainess involvement. With theae component*, job 
training can have a meaningful affect upon unemployment.
(iii). Work.hirint
Thia paper considers two type of worksharing: cyclical 
and permanent. Cyclical work-sharing is commonly referred to 
as Short Time Compensation (STC) in the literature. It 
provides partial unemployment compensation benefits to 
employees that experience workweek reductions in order to 
prevent layoffs or dismissals within a specific firm. 
Permanent worksharing is better known as the Reduced Workweek 
(RW) and involves a decision to permanently reduce the 
workweek length to produce more jobs. These programs are 
often accompanied with a requirement for higher overtime 
premiums in order to increase demand for workers and not 
merely overtime. Tbe first solution, STC, is temporary in 
that it provides only for layoffs which result from economic 
downturns. The latter solution, RW, is long term and seeks 
to create jobs by spreading the employment around and thereby
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attenuating technological unemployment,, Both solutions have 
many similarities in concept and results, but they remain 
different enough to warrant a specific investigation into 
each •
A. Temporary Work-»h.rin. tSTCl
As previously mentioned, STC is only a minor change in 
the existing unemployment insurance (01) system. For example, 
under the standard 01 program, a firm deciding to cut back 
production 10 percent due to recessionary forces, would 
layoff 10 percent of the workforce and supply them with full 
unemployment compensation benefits. Under STC programs the 
workweek would be temporarily reduced 10 percent (e.g., to 36 
hours/week) and all employees would receive some compensation 
for lost work time. Bence, STC would prevent temporary 
layoffs in this scenario by spreading the work around the 
labor force.
Because of its simplicity and intuitive appeal, most 
would immediately question why something such as STC has not 
been adopted. Yet for the bulk of Europe, it is already a 
reality. According to Dr. Fred Best of the 0pjohn Institute 
for Employment Research and foremost scholar in the field of 
work-sharing, the list of countries participating in 1TC 
programs is impressive. Included in the list are the Federal
Republic of Germany, Belgium, Luxumberg, France, Italy, Great 
Britain, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, Austria and Canada. 
Moreover, the State of California has implemented a STC 
program in the wake of proposition 13. Signed into lam by 
Governor Brown in 1978, the program is entitled "Worksharing 
01." The legiclation gives employers the option of either 
laying off workers and providing them with UI benefits or 
decreasing the workweek and distributing the same amount of 
pai. benefits to those with reduced hours. There are various 
stipulations, of course, such as workweek reduction must be a 
least 10 percent and the benefits will be paid only for a 
period of 20 weeks. But all things considered, the program 
has been remarkable in its results and the insight which it 
has furnished to other states.
Although the results of the California program are still 
coming in, some conclusions are evident. Survey data indicate 
that as early as December 1979, 25 of 30 firms responding
favored the new option --  the other five remained neutral.
Similarly, survey data from the participating unions 
indicates that opposition to the program remains in the 
minority (Best, 1981:89)• Dr. Best further noted that "four 
union repreentatives reported initial resitance to the 
program from members, but also noted that opposition has 
dropped off once workers became familiar with the idea."
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(Best ,1981:190) Unfortunately, even vith the program's 
acceptance, utilisation remains low due to its lack of 
publicity. Perhaps if more states mould follow California's 
lead, participation would increase geometrically.
Besides the fact that STC programs preserve jobs in the 
short run and are more equitable in the sense that they 
spread the hardships of unemployment, these programs have 
several other benefits. Three of the more prominent are 
mentioned here.
1. Reduced Average Wage Rates
As Best summed up the proposition, "Despite higher firm 
expenditures per hour of labor on fixed fringe benefit 
commitments, overall labor costs are likely to be lower under 
STC because restrictions in work time for all employees as 
opposed to total layoff of low paid junior workers will tend 
to reduce average wages rates." (Best, 1981 : 91)
2. Better Job Transition
In instances when the industrial downturn is permanent, STC 
would furnish a stable transition mechanism for job search 
while maintaing full employment levels. For instance, the 
STC program in California would allow for 5 months of 
"employed" job search time as a substitute for layoffs. 
Moreover, such a mechanism could be used to provide free time 
for retraining workers for new industries.
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3. Improved Cyclical Stabilisation
During periods of economic recession, guaranteed employment 
and job security through SIC would also improve the 
confidence of ecnomic agents and thus moderate the cycle. 
Vicious cycles of reduced confidence and spending would be 
restrained.
After examining the primary benefits, the questions of 
applicability and administrative efficiency immediately pose 
themselves. In terms of applicability, Best found the STC 
program to be suitable for practically all firms. As for 
administrative efficiency, though Best prefaces his rebuttal 
by stating no formal assessment has been made, "anecdotbl 
reports suggest that exiating short-time compensation 
programs have been administered effectively and efficiently." 
(1981 : 113 )
Clearly, after the previous investigation into STC 
policies, such policies are deserving of more government and 
corporate attention. Unfortunately, such attention is not 
forthcomming at resent.
B. Permanent Work-.h.r i r.g [BV]
As articulated before, permament work-sharing proposals 
or reduced workweek plans (RW) entail the permamnent
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reduction of the workweek in order to spread the benefits of 
productivity gains among all workers. Four major benefits 
are argued as results of RW plans.
1. Massive Job Creation
Many estimates exist regarding the potential for job 
creation by altering the workweek. According to economist 
Mathan Spero, for every one hour reduction in the workweek, 
1.4 million more jobs will be created. Furthermore, a five 
hour reduction would yield 7.85 million more jobs 
(Spero,1979:470). Best calculated that a 10 percent 
reduction in the workweek would produce anywhere from a 
conservative 1 to 2.5 million jobs to the optimistic 
projection of 10 million jobs (1981:42). Finally, McGaughey 
calculated that reducation could add as many as 19,776,000 
new workers (both part-time and full-time) to the work force 
(1981:99). Of course, more empirical work is needed to 
narrow a particular estimate, but in any event we may 
conclude that a significant number of jobs would be created.
2. Vorkers Desire More Leisure and Mould Welcome KM
Again we turn back to the first SEW principle --  to
meet the desires of those the program is to serve. In this 
case, survey data clearly demonstrates workers are willing 
and even desire a reduced workweek; they want more leisure 
and less work. Worksharing, accordingly, has the benefit of
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not only producing store employment opportunites , but alto 
producing those opportunities most desired. Best presented 
some of the survey data:
Worktime trends and recent survey studies of employee 
preferences indicate that a growing portion of the U.S. 
work force was willing to forgo earnings for time sway 
from their jobs. One study of American workers 
indicates that this interest in reduced worktime may be 
quite notable. (1981:35)
Researchers, furthermore, have found overwhelming data to 
indicate workers will welcome part-time job opportunities as 
an alternative to the conventional 40 hour workweek. In 
particular Melts, Reid and Swarts of the Center for 
Industrial Relations at the University of Toronto found that 
"changes in social attitudes have led to an increase in the 
particiaption rates of women, especially married women, in 
the labor ofrce. The resulting increase in the number of 
multiple-earner families in the labor ofrce can be expected 
to intensify the desire for employment in jobs that demand 
less than full time particiaption.M (Melts, et al,1981:140) 
Thus, in terms of the meeting of the true needs of workers, 
it appears that a permanent reduction in the workweek
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deserves more consideration by unions, firms, and the 
government.
3. Productivity Improves
It has been veil documented that under vorksharing 
programs absenteeism decreases, morale and enthusiasm 
increases, and productivity improves.
Absenteeism vill decrease under vorksharing plans since 
employees vill have more time to conduct their personal 
business and exercise their leisure. Consequently, 
productivity vill likely improve. The bulk of the 
productivity research in RW plans supports this contention 
(McCaughey,1981).
The evidence on morale and enthusiasm is almost as 
clear. For instance, Fepresentative Conyers explained 
that "many industries have already adopted a shorter 
vorkveek, and this has spurred morale and productivity, and 
prevented a further loss of valuable industrial jobs." 
(1981:xii) Moreover, Melts, eC al«, revieved the available 
literature and concluded that "studies of actual job-sharing 
situations indicate that productivity often rises because the 
job-sharing employees bring mor* energy and enthusiasm to the 
job." (1981:30)
Specific case studies of RV in operation illustrate this 
point. For example, The Pnlted St.t.i Hew. «nd World Report
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examined tht case of Meisel Corporation in 1971:
The Meisel Corporation, in Atlanta ... switched its 
plant from the standard five-day week to seven days --- 
two shifts of three and a half days each. Employees 
work 36 hours, but get paid for 40 hours if their 
attendance is perfect. Even though total labor costa 
are higher because 28 employees had to be hired, Meisel 
V.P. Tom Melder says, "Our labor costs are actually 
less per worker. Overtime is practically nil. Sales 
have incresed 25 percent. Job recruiting is painless."
Another case in point is that of Medtonic Corporation:
Management analysis at the end of the 3-month trial 
revealed that company goals were being met: Medtronic 
had maintained or improved high standards of service to 
its customers, high standards of quality, production 
requirements, and coordination among departments. "In 
fact," reported Medtronic President Earl E. Bakken, "we 
have not only sustained overall productivity but have 
increased it in many areas." (McCarthy and 
Rosenberg,1981)
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Both the examples of Medtronic and the example of Meisel 
Corporation furniah the conclusion that permanent work 
sharing is a viable policy for at least some major 
industries, if not all.
4. Government Spending Could Be Pruned 
This contention is intuitive. If unemployment can be 
reduced without additional government spending, the 
government would be able to reduce its other job creation 
programs and welfare (income maintenance) policies.
Professors Blumroaen and Culf of Rutgers support this 
position. As they argued, "a thirty-two hour workweek that 
spreads work to those who were formerly unemployed will have 
other benefits as well. First, it should reduce some welfare 
payments to those workers who formerly could not find 
employment. This would in turn reduce their welfare 
dependency•* (1983/4:409) Furthermore, William McGaughey 
noted that work sharing would have beneficial effects toward 
balancing the budget:
By cutting the workweek, government might create new 
jobs with little or no outlay of additional funds. No 
expensive "jobs1 program would be necessary. No deficit 
spending to prime the pump for prosperity needs to be 
proposed. With a stable budget and more people working,
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inflation might gradually be brought under control. 
(1981:172)
Moreover» McCaughey noted that the unemployment-inflation 
tradeoff mould not be operating under the scenario of reduced 
workweek since more income is not being paid out. Rather the
unemployment is constant --  it is merely being spread out
among workers (1981:175). We can begin to see the underlying 
beauty of this approach to permanent unemployment: it solves 
for the sociological and * ychological problems of 
unemployment while aiding the economy and meeting workers' 
desires for more leisure time.
Permanent work-sharing is definitely in need or more 
careful consideration by the government --- especially in 
light of the above benefits. Above a!l, it should be noted 
that a shorter workweek is not a new invention in the United 
States. As Representaitive Conyers gave the historical 
context:
forty years have passed since the Fair Labor Standards 
Act which established the 40 hour week. The reduction 
in the workweek during that period accounted for 
substantial gains in employment. There is strong reason 
to believe that a similar reduction today, coupled with
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strong disincentives to employers to use overtime as a 
substitute for hiring new workers, would create 
substantial new employment* (1978:H2896)
It has worked in the past; it certainly offers prospects for 
the future.
(iv). Public Work* *nd Public Strvict Employment 
Proponents of jobs programs emphasise that if the 
economy can not provide full employment, then the government 
has a duty to guarantee employment by being the employer of 
last resort* Since unemployment is seemingly a permanent 
feature of our economy, only by this method can we assure 
everyone the right to work.
The evidence that government employment would work is 
strong. Richard Nathan of Princeton University explained 
before the Senate Infrastructure and Job Hearings in 1983:
Job creation can work. There i a lot of discussion to 
the effect that all job creation programs, particularly 
in the public sector, are "make work" or leaf raking and 
non-useful kinds of work, or that local governments 
simply use this money in place of their own money. We 
have done a lot of research over the last five years on
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government programs to create jobs. It is my conclusion 
that Federal Government job creation programs can work. 
(1983:175)
In particular, moat advocates argue that massive 
infrastructure rebuilding is greatly needed and nov is the 
time to solve both problems with the same program 
(Peter son, 1983)• Arguments and estimates abound as to the 
degree of infrastructure rebuilding necessary for our nation. 
Over the next decade, it is estimated that * *ween $1 and $3 
trillion needs to be spent (Vaughan , 1983 ).
On the other hand, many proponents of public employment 
suggest that public works is only a temporary employer. 
Accordingly, we should employ workers in public services as 
well.
Two immediate objections arise concerning public 
employment as a solution to the unemployment problem. First, 
it would be incredibly costly to implement. Second, it would 
cause a burgeoning growth of government.
Concerning the cost objection, the costs of direct 
federal government employment programs are not aa great as 
their critics suggest. Numerous estimates exist for both 
public service employment (PSE) and public works employment 
(PWE) which place the cost of each job-year between $11 and
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$14 thousand (CBO,1982; Howe,1983 ; Riv1 in , 1983 ). For 
example, William Mirengoff of the Bureau of Social Science 
Reatarch stated that $5 billion in appropriations would 
generate 375,000 jobs which will reach about 9.4 percent of 
the 4 million long-term unemployed (1983:354). And because 
our welfare roles can be expected to decrease and tax 
revenues can be expected to increase, there is a definite pay 
back of some of the outlay (1983:354). Finally, some have 
even gone to the point to suggest the payback in total dollar 
costs is greater than the outlay* Smith and Zeller of West 
Virginia University argued this point:
To this should be added another point of agreement —  
the reduction of unemployment and poverty and the 
resulting diminution of welfare expenditures and other 
transfer payments would add to the nation's total social 
welfare to the extent that the savings realised through 
having formerly nonproductive members of society become 
productive memebers were larger than the costs of 
realising that achievement. (1981:519)
Consequently, if Smith and Zeller are correct, then there can 
be no doubt that a federal jobs program would move us closer 
to the socially optimal point of equity and efficiency.
58
The argument of government size must also be considered. 
Fere the issues are more difficult to resolve since the 
effects of government sice are difficult to quantify* Shiller 
provides the basic criticism to the federal jobs program:
Public service employment programs are also opposed 
because they enlarge the size of the public sector. When 
the government creates more public jobs, it acquires 
greater control over our economic decisons. Moreover, a 
larger public sector implies that fever resources will 
be available for the production of private goods and 
services. (1980:200)
An immediate rebuttal to this argument exists: if the private 
sector is not currently using all of its resources (i.e., its 
labor) than what does it matter if the government utilizes 
the surplus?
Similarly, we must deal with the economic growth 
argument. Many suggest that government size is 
inversely proportional to eoncomic growth. The data shows 
otherwise. An invesitigation of this suggestion finds that 
total taxes as a percentage of GNP are larger in Austria, 
Belgium, France, Germany, and Greece than the United States, 
both postwar and since 1973. Among OECD countries where the
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governments are smaller, only one has grovn faster, Japan. 
(McMahon,1984)
Finally, the critics of federally guaranteed job
programs would contend that government size --  if it grows
too large --  will be the prelude to socialism. T can think
of no better response than that often given by Thurow:
The time ha> come, however, to admit that the pursuit of 
equity and equal opportunity demands a fundamental 
restructuring of the economy. Everyone who wants to 
work should have chance to work. But there is no way 
to achieve that situation by tinkering marginally with 
current economic policies. The only solution is to 
create a socialized sector of the economy designed to 
give work opportunites to everyone who wants them but 
cannot find them elsewhere. (1980:206)
The response seems a bit too simplisitc. But if the socially 
optimal mix of equity and efficiency requires a socialized 
labor market, than there is no real argument presented. The 
critics only present a dogmatic attack against government
invo1vement.
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Policy Interrelationships
It would be myoptic for a policy maker tc consider only 
individual policies and grade then according to an evaluation 
conducted in a vacuum. Policy A and Polloy B may both be 
beneficial, but Policy A+B may be diaaatorous. Likewise, 
Policy C and Policy D may both be ineffective, but Policy C*D 
may be successful* Aaron observed this same phenomena in 
employment policies:
... Improved education and training may be Ineffective 
in increasing earning capacity unless steps are also 
taken to change the mix of available ^obs, and efforts 
to change the mix of available ^obs may fall if low-wage 
workers lack training and education. Either taken alone 
might fail, when both together might succeed. (1976:156)
Consequently, a systematic examination necessarily requires 
theme synergistic effects to be analysed.
Some of the more important synergistic efects are 
graphically ilustrated below:
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income maintenance
short-term compensation 4
stab i1i sat ion
job banks
workfare
job training
Double arrows connect policies to their results; single 
arrows connect policies to their complements.
First, we consider the inter-relationships between job 
banks, job training, and job creation. Banks and training 
are directly related. Job banks help locate workers 
according to their appropriate skills (i.e«, their training}; 
and job training seeks to train workers for the available 
jobs (i.a. , via job banks}. Both are related to job creation 
in a similar fashion. Job creation policies work more 
efectively if they create jobs which can be supplied with 
labor (i•e.,training exists} and workers can be directed to 
them (i.e., job banks}; and the same holds true in the 
reverse.
Meat, we consider the relationships of short-term
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compensation• Short-term compensation is complemented by job 
banks by allowing more effective job search in dying 
industries. STC complements macro-economic stabilisation 
policy by restoring worker and consumer confidence.
Finally, workfare complements income maintenance 
policies by providing incentives to work. But because 
workfare on a large scale requires job creation, job creation 
policies necessarily complement workfare.
Renee, from the above summary of synergistic effects, it 
is clear how ominous the chore of selecting an employment 
policy is. From the 8 policies presented, thousands of 
possible combinations exist! Nonetheless, it is apparent that 
any ALMF program must be a cluster of policies to ensure 
optimal affects. And just as one would not conduct foreign 
policy by assigning a different agency or program to each 
country, one would not wish to implement an employment 
program with a handful of uncoordinated policies. Many 
policies are needed to jointly work with one another.
Sweden's National Labor Market Board, with its profound 
success at keeping the unemployment rate under 4 percent 
through ALMP, demonstrates that such clustered 
decision-making is possible and cost-effective:
For students of labor market policies, Sweden holds
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special fascination. Not including unemployment 
compensation, its National Labor Market Board spends 
about 2.4 percent of the GNP per year (1982-1983), the 
equivalent of about $80 billion in 1983 dollars for an 
economy of our sire. Its unemployment rate for the past 
20 years (since data comparable to the U.S. labor force 
surveys have been available) has remained below 4 
percent; the average is much lower. ... The commitment 
of resources and the low unemployment rate are tightly 
connected. (Wilensky,1985:14)
Thua we see a coordinated effort at active labor market
policies is indeed possible --  and fruitful.
There are other policy considerations besides 
synergistic effects and direct policy consequences. These 
other effects are referred to as indirect policy concerns and 
are equally important. We turn to an examination of those
now •
V.
lud i 1s? t p9 1 i&xi f l i im a i
When evaluating policy, all too often policy makers and 
elected officials overlook important issues vhich are not 
immdiately noticeable. For example, policy change can often 
serve as a catalyst or as a sedative for further action. 
Moreover, such action could also foster backlash vhich not 
only removes the initial policy, but goes further and 
destroys past policy gains. Finally, there are indirect costs 
involved in policy-making in terms of coalition building and 
resources for other policies. And beyond all of these 
issues, there exists the question of federalism --- vhich 
level of government should a particular policy be 
implemented? These questions make up the indirect policy 
concerns and are discussed vithin this chapter.
( U .  Policy Action it « C.t.lv.t for Furth.r Chan..
Policy may serve as a catalyst for further policy 
demands. The reasoning easily follows. A particular policy 
might serve to merely whet the appetite of its beneficiaries. 
Murray Edelman provided the definitive statement of these 
effect, in hi. book Politic. .. Symbolic Action. A. Edclm.n 
argued the point:
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Normally, the achievement of a declared political 
objective not only fails to put to rest the political 
interest in question, but also leads to the advancement 
of more ambitious claims of the same general character 
as the satisfied claim. (1971:153}
Thus, accepting Edelman's thesis and applying it to the issue 
of federal employment policy, the achievement of a 
full-employment policy can be expected to cause similar 
social demands for health, education, etc. to increase.
(ii). Policy Action .« . S.d.tiv. for Croup fr.tiure 
This is a reversal of the above* Edelman argues that in 
some cases action may reassure groups and produce quicsence 
in the future. As he stated the scenario, "Groups which 
present claims upon resources may be rendered quiescent by 
their success in securing non-tangible values*" (1971:40) He 
furtber stresses under what conditions policy quiescence may 
emerge:
Public programs ••• those offering occasional increases 
in benefits and those relying upon regular but vague 
assertions that a threat is being checked meet these two 
conditions. Programs of both types demonstrably
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maintain qiuesence, apparently indefinitely. (1971:164)
Hence, policies which gradually change tend to produce 
quiescence for full reform. This is in contrast to 
wide-sweeping policies which tend to lead to even turther 
change. Applying this argument to employment policy, current 
"employmentH policies which transfer income to those out of 
work cause innovations to be overlooked. Instead benefits 
are incrementally increaaed and no one complaina 
aignificantly about the policy.
(iii). Policy Action .« . Citilv.t for »«ekl.«h
Significant policy change can so infuriate the 
opposition that they mount a counter-offensive which succeeds 
not only in removing the policy, but further damaging other 
past policy actions. For example, Emil Masey, Secretary 
Treasurer for the United Auto Workers, argued that a liberal 
third party movement, either labor or socialist in 
construction, would end up strengthening the "most 
reactionary elements of the Republican Party." (1974:169) In 
terms of employment and welfare policy, both Darity (1983) 
and Gilder (1981) have noted a growing public dissatisfaction 
with our welfare system to the point of threatening the 
existence of the programs themselves. Hence, if they are not
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soon restructured or if they were suudenenly increased 
without a change in direction, the programs might be wiped 
out by public backlash. Consequently, any major initiative 
in employment policy must be well understood by the public as 
an improvement in the welfare system and an attempt to remove 
the unproductive elements in the existing program. Otherwise, 
the well-meaning government program may be immediately shot 
down •
(iv). Policy Action and it. Opportunity Co»t»
Most economic textbooks describe the opportunity costs 
of a unit of product A as the value of other products which 
might have been produced with the same resources. Similarly 
with policy, the opportunity costs of policy A are the 
benefits which might have been produced with the same 
resources•
Tn this case, the opportunity cost of a given employment 
policy are the benefits which might have been derived from 
the revenue and concensus building which went into that 
policy. Steinbrunner explains the tradeoff:
It is a basic fact to the human condition that any 
significant effort to produce an intended outcome 
consumes resources: time, money, mangerial talent,
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political opportunity, or whatever. Since resources are 
devoted to m  purpose or another, top two values which 
are •operate enomgh to be dietinquishable will stand at 
leaet a theoretical tradeoff relationship. (1974)
Moreover, the tradeoff can take the fora of coalitions for 
future action* Thus, the coalitions formed for policy A may 
not be used for policy B. Charles Schults describes this 
phenomena:
Beyond the more immediate opportunity costs of decisions
--  the costs of one decision in terms of others --
there are opportunity costs for the dticion-making 
process as a whole. To secure the enactment of a 
positive program of actions* a consensus or coalition 
must be put together. Decisions which put a radical 
strain on the consensus may take their toll not only in 
individual future decisions, but on the whole process. 
The consensus may be destroyed, the coalition 
fragmented, the process disrupted. (1968:46)
Subsequently, when a decison If oade to adopt a particular 
policy, the costs which should be measured must also take 
into consideration those policies which could have been
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adopted but which now say not be.
(v). P.J.nliim »■< national Policy 
Issues of federal control originate in the 
Constitution's tenth amendment which reserves powers not 
specifically granted to the federal government to the states 
and the people. The theory behind this is worth noting. 
Tyranny, it is argued, always accompanies centralization of 
power. Thus, federalism is the bulwark of protection to 
individual liberty. Moreover, others have argued that 
decontrolitat ion provides innovation and dynamism which is an 
improvement over our experience with national policy-making. 
Centralisation, on the other hand, has diseconomies of scale 
because of its massive size (Posner , 1982) • As Joyce explained 
the situation:
11 is clear that the centralisation of power is deadly 
both to voluntarism and to the spirit of 
self-government. Centralisation is always accompanied 
by bureaucracy and administration, both of which turns 
citisens into passive recipients of rules and 
regulations. (1982:400)
As a result, we should seek to place needed government
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p r o g r a m *  at the state or local level. Specifically in term* 
of welfare policy and meeting the poor'* needs, Levy of the 
Urban Institute stated:
The lover the level of administering government, the 
more ; 1ninistrators are likety to know about local labor 
markets, the possibilities for employment, and so on, 
and the more likely they are to be able to design 
program* which accurately define the "truly needy." 
(1980:58)
From these arguments, the benfits of decentralisation are 
clear.
On the other side of the question, there are many 
objections toward decentralising employment policy. First, 
employment is a national problem and thus should be adresaed 
with national policy. Any redistribution should be conducted 
at the highest level of government in order to most fairly 
place the burdens of change. Otherwise localities suffering 
from high unemployment and a low tax base would be in 
difficult straights. If we truly wish to help all the 
unemployed, a national policy is justified. This, of course, 
is not to say there could not be decentralised administrative 
units, merely that the prime objectives and resources should
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come from the highest level of government.
A second objection to decentrs1isstion is that of 
migration. Because disparities in welfare policies exist 
among states, migrations have resulted which threaten the 
most generous states and hurt some of our largest cities. 
Leonard Greene of the Institute for Socioeconomic Studies 
explained:
Discrepencies in benefits among states, variations in 
the cost of living notwithstanding, are inequitable and 
self-defeating. In fact, they cause one of the most
serious problems in the current system --  welfare
migration. No matter what their ideological 
perspective, most analysts now recognise that 
disparities in welfare benefits have caused a 
substantial population movement from low-benefit states, 
such as those in the South, to the high-benefit states 
of the North and Vest. ... The influx of welfare 
recipients has imposed a heavy burden on many states and 
has been a major contrubutor to the financial woes of 
some of our largest cities. (1981:130)
A final criticism of the decentralisation is interest 
group pressure. It is so strong at the local level that
7 2
policy tends to reflect their inclinations rather thin those 
of the policy-makers. State legislators ate too easily 
influenced due to the closeness of their constituency. As 
Dugger indicated, "In general, the influence of business 
special interest groups on government is much stronger at 
both the local and state levels than at the federal level." 
(1982:887) Accordingly, decentralised policy is less likely 
to be prudent and more likely to reflect tero-aum contests 
among groups. Barbara Ehrenreich and Francis Fox Piven give 
their appeal for national policy-making in the realm of 
welfare and employment policies:
lesponsibi1ity for social-welfare programs should be 
firmly fixed at the federal level. Influence from the 
Right works for decentralisation to the state level in 
order to increase the power of business interests over 
the income-maintenance programs that bear most directly 
on labor markets. For just this reason we should fight 
for the outright nationalisation of financing and 
policy-making responsibility for such programs as AFDC, 
unemployment insurance, and Medicaid. Benefits and 
eligibility standards should be uniform across the 
nation, and their financing should not be subject to the 
whims of state legislators. (1984:168)
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As a result, if sc wish programs which are systematically 
designed for a given objective to remain in operation as 
planned, then these programs should be administrered by the 
federal government. If however, we value the aspect of 
particiapation as an end in itself and more important than 
the resulting policy's effects, then decentralisation is 
certainly in order.
In the case of employment policy with its obvious 
national orientation, its potential problems with state 
migration, and its need for careful design and implementation 
away from pressure groups, it is contended here that national 
policy is in order.
lltBI. 113
The issues presented in this chapter are meant to be 
examples of indirect policy affects which should be 
considered by policy-makers in the government. The list is 
certainly not comprehensive, but rather selective and 
i 1 lustrat ive•
VI.
Political Rea 1 i t iti >nd Public Policy
Throughout this paper, the goals sod needs of society 
have been discussed, proposals to meet those needs have been 
examined, and the political ramifications of the process have 
been analysed. We nov turn to an exanination of the current 
status of policy-asking in the United States and the 
likelihood for employment policy. Specifically, ve shall 
exaaine the increaental approach to decision-asking and its 
appropriateness in our systea and ve shall evaluate the 
conditions for iaproveaent of this approach. Once this is 
accomplished, ve vill have traced the issues involved in 
employment policy from the very specific issues of effects 
and needs to the much broader issues of social goals and 
political realities.
(i). Tb. Increment.1 Sv.ttn of Pol i ev-a.kinit
Incrcaenta1isa is the slov and deliberate approach to 
solving policy problems vithin the United States. More 
specifically, it is a systea of policy change vhich is 
characterised by "increment&” of change over a period of time 
and not by vide-sveeping policy shifts. As Braybrooke and 
Lindblom described the systea:
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This kind of decision-making it decison making through 
•vtll or incremental moves rather than through a 
comprehensiva rcfort program. ... Moreover, it it 
exploratory in that the goals of po 1 icy-making continue 
to change at new experience with policy throws new light 
on what it possible and desirable. In this sense, it is 
also better described as moving away from known social 
ills rather than as moving toward 42 known and relatively 
•table goal. (1970:71)
The benefits of such selective and incremental change are 
certainly apparent. Definite goals with comprehensive policy 
evaluation are no longer a requirement. Rather, selective 
information and knowledge that a particular incremental 
change is socially desirable is all that is necessary.
This selective change is essential in today's 
information based society. Brock, et al. (1973) argued 
that "the rational approach to decison-making being 
comprehensive, it assumes that all the facts are collected 
and all the alternatives arc considered. Today, the 
problem-solver is forced to be more selective. With rapidly 
changing circumstances and the quantity of material being 
published in inter-related disciplines, no one person or
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group of people can possibly collect and analyse all the 
facts, so one is always deciding and acting upon incomplete 
information.” (1973:5) Consequently, Brock, et al. suggest 
that a realistic policy-maker should selectively analyse 
policies to determine if their incremental adoption 
is comparatively advantageous over the status quo. And thus 
today's policy-maker makes small steps with selective 
information. If the step is good, it is often followed by 
another; if it is bad, a new path is chosen (at least in 
theory).
This incremental approach also solves the problems of 
goal selection for the policy-maker. Braybrooke and Linblom 
explain:
[One] need not aak himself if liberty is precious and, 
if so, whether it is more precious than security; he 
need only consider whether an increment of the one value 
is desirabale and whether, when we must choose between 
the two, an increment of one is worth an increment or 
the other• (1971:85)
Once again incrementalism appears to be a good policy-making 
system.
The problem with incremental policy change, however,
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is that it produces the undesirable effect of symbolic 
quiescence (chp.5). As a result* if the incremental policies 
are in fact deleterious to social welfare, there may be 
little pressure from society for a change. Reform 
never really surfaces* This criticism ir particulalry 
appropriate to welfare and employment policy. As Albrecht 
suggested the point in 1980:
The only way in which change can occur is to placate the 
relevant interest groups by giving each something it 
wants* Accordingly, the only significant changes in the 
welfare system which art likely to occur are incremental 
increases in benefit levels and incremental increases in 
the number of people on the welfare rolls. Certainly 
this is exactly what has happened to all previous 
attempts at welfare reform, and there is little reason 
to believe things will change. In fact, there is leas 
and less reason to expect change, because there are more 
and more people with a stake in the existing system. As 
the process of incrementally increasing the welfare 
budget continues, movement toward a significantly 
different system becomes increasingly unlikely.
(1980:22)
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Thus the problem with incremental iso lies in its tendlencies 
to halt reform efforts.
It is intuitively disturbing when incrementalism in one 
form has great power for dealing with information and 
improving welfare, and in the other form entrenches the 
problems policy was meant to solve. It appears, we are 
dealing with two types of incrementalism: dynamic and static. 
Dynamic incrementalism is innovative and continually audits 
policy for improvements; static lnorementallsm is 
bureauoratlo and self-perpetuating. Clearly, dynamic 
incrementalism offers great hope for innovative polloles to 
attenuate unemployment. Such a system would carefully 
evaluate many of the same polloles presented within chapter 
four and inorementally move toward one or more. This Is 
obviously not oocurlng. Static incrementalism characterises 
the present system. Albrecht’s description of the system 
should be well noted.
In order to remove this problem of static 
lnorementallsm, Llnowes proposes the SEM audit. Such an 
audit would continually evaluate programs within the context 
of the ten principles presented (ch. 1) to make certain that 
possible improvements are undertaken. In this way, 
lnorementallsm takes on a dynamic quality. But is this true 
for employment policy in particular? The answer is "yes*1
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provided the initial policy allova for proper incremental 
change •
Due to the interrelationahipa in employment policy and 
particularly ALWP, the initial program muat be comprehensive 
and coordinated. That la, all relevant policies muat be 
brought under one authority so that interrelationships also 
may be dealt with incrementally. Otherwise, incremental 
improvements in policies A and B my yield a worsening of 
policy A*B.
In the case of ALMF, we would do well to note Sweden's 
example of the NLMB which was previously outlined. This 
board coordinates all ALMP and incrementally adjusts policy 
to meet changing demands. Vilensky explains this need for a 
larger context for evaluation comparatively:
... the character of evaluation research and its effect 
on labor market policy (or public polciy in general) 
depend upon the context in which it is financed and 
used: fragmented and decentralized political economies 
such a the United States foster isolated, single-issue 
research, typically focused on short-run effects and 
used for political ammunition rather than policy 
planning; more "corporatist" systems such as those of 
Sweden, Norway, Austria, and perhaps Germany foster
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dialogue betwev researchers, bureaucrats, and 
politicians in which a wider range of issues are 
connected, longer-range effects are more often 
considered, and research findings are more often used 
for policy planning and implementation as well as budget 
justification. Larger contexts for bargaining --- 
especially among labor, management, and government --- 
mean larger contexts for policy analysis, with or 
without rigorous evaluation research. (1985:8*9) (ii).
Thus, long-term, non-political goals can be approached and 
achieved within a broader context of policy analysis and 
authority --- through centralised, dynamic incrementalism.
(ii). The Political R.«litit» of Eacloyiot PoU.c_y 
A primary issue preventing both innovative employment 
policies and dynamic change was appropriately termed the 
sero-sum problem by Thurow. He describes our economic 
system as one where the winnings equal the losses. Thus, in 
order to help one group, sacrifices must be made. The 
problem concerns people accepting those sacrifices. It tak^s 
a substantial advantage in power to overcome a particular 
group. But since most groups are well-matched in our system, 
action is scarce. This is our "fundamental problem. Cur
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economic problems are solvable. For most of our problems 
there are several solutions. But all have the characteristic 
that someone must suffer large economic losses. No one wants 
to volunteer for this role, and we have a political process 
that is incapable of forcing anyone to shouder this burden. 
Everyone wants someone else to suffer the necessary losses, 
and as a consequence none of the possible solutions can be 
adopted.11 (1980:121 )
Thurov continues in his treatise claiming that revived 
party politica would yield the necessary power and 
reaponsibi1ity for action. In a strong party system, the 
majority party has the responsibility and power to implement 
programs which will solve the nation's woes. Tf such a party 
fails, it becomes the minority party in the next election. 
Therefore, the responsibility is ''clear, and failures can be 
punished." (1980:212)
Another primary reason why sound active labor market 
policies are not adopted is the lack of concern for SEM 
principles. In particular, we must tie success with funding 
and program continuation, and not tie funding with problem 
continue t ion.
A final reason for not adopting ALMP is myopia. Too 
often, immediate political or social gain is sought instead 
of meeting long run human needs. True cost-benefit analysis
trust consider long-tern effects. For example, the cost per 
person of a particular employment program may be greater than 
the previous welfare expenditure to the unemployed. But we 
already discovered unemployment has many long-run and hidden 
effects (CVD mortality, crime, etc.) which also take a toll 
upon society and should be included in the analysis. When 
this is considered, the costs of the employment policy 
(discounted for hidden benefits) may be actually less than 
current income transfer welfare programs. It is precisely 
these overlooked effects which must be brought into policy 
analysis to make a fair evaluation.
In summary, many obstacles stand in the way of a dynamic 
employment policy. Zero-sum contest* make the political 
struggles difficult; lack of SEM applications stagnates 
existing programs; and myopia biases the current evaluations 
taking place. A national comprehensive employment policy 
which attenuates both existing welfare payments and poverty 
is needed. Such a policy could go far in improving the 
performance of our economy. Unfortunately, policy science by 
itself may not have the energy to bring about this change.
VII .
Cone 1 iij ion*
This paper presented a diverse and disparate 
conglomeration of issues surrounding employment in the United 
States. On the outset it is hoped that the public policy 
process and all of its intricacits and difficult barriers has 
been demonstrated. In more detail, it is hoped that 
individual issues of harms, social goals, policy tradeoffs 
and interrelationthipa, indirect policy concerns, and the 
political realities of our time have all been shown in better 
light. Tf this purpose was fulfilled, then this paper has 
made a meaningful contribution. If this purpose was only 
partially fulfilled then at laast the initial caveat by Alice 
Rivlin was demonstrated: this paper has revealed how 
difficult the problems and choices involved are.
Quod Irat Damonatratum
8 3
Sjilsjl
The methodology of the study mentioned in chapter 3 is 
straight forvard• A random sample of 200 college students was 
conducted through the campus mail system at the University of 
Illinois during the fall of 1984. 66 responded to the survey
and indicated their preferences among several sample 
societies with varying total outputs under the assumption 
that they mould randomly be placed in one of the positions in 
the society they selected. Also, respondents indicated their 
ovn ideal sample society. Though 8 designed egalitarian 
societies, the remaining had stratification to a degree. 
Moreover, these results mere all tested across sex, family 
income, and race and all demonstrated similar patterns of 
desired stratification.
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